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HEADQUARTERS MULTI-NATIONAL FORCE - IRAQ APO AE 09316-1400

23 January 2006

MEMORANDUM FOR Secretary of Defense

SUBJECT: Multi-National Force-Iraq Off-Ramp Decision Points

1. (U) Purpose. To identify the MNF-I 2006 off-ramp decision point concept.

2. (S) Bottom Line. Broad trends in Iraq develop over time. The MNF-I conditions-based offramp strategy is best supported by decision points at three month intervals, permitting accurate assessment of the required conditions for unit off-ramps in the context of these broad trends. More frequent decision points risk reacting to event spikes and making off-ramp decisions prematurely. The placement of these decision points at three month intervals, while allowing the right interval of time to accurately assess off-ramp conditions, also aligns appropriately with the requisite time needed to work the inter-agency process and conduct the required planning to deploy and redeploy affected forces.

## 3. (U) Facts.

a. (S) MNF-I continuously assesses the situation in Iraq, both in terms of the enemy situation and the capability of friendly forces (Coalition and Iraqi) to accomplish the mission. Broad trends in Iraq develop over time and week-to-week (and even month-to-month) upward or downward spikes in enemy activity or friendly capability often do not identify the true long-term trends. An additional factor in the coming months is the new dynamic of the impact our off-ramping of units will have in Iraq. We anticipate that there will be a time lag of perhaps several months from the time an off-ramped unit departs Iraqi until we identify the full effect of that unit's departure.

b. (S) In order to make our off-ramp recommendations in the context of the broad security trends in Iraq, the MNF-I 2006 off-ramp strategy is supported by three decision points: March, June, and September 2006. Each decision point supports the off-ramp of 1 - 2 brigade combat teams and associated combat support and combat service support elements. These decision points were selected based on the time it takes to identify broad trends in Iraq as well as the time we believe it will take for the effect of previous unit off-ramps to be felt on the ground. The placement of these decision points at this interval also synchronizes with the time required to work the inter-agency process and conduct the requisite planning to deploy and redeploy affected forces.

4. (S) Conclusion. Reacting to monthly data "spikes" or making the next off-ramp decision before the impact of previous unit off-ramps is determined risks making off-ramp decisions prematurely. Once set in motion, an off-ramp decision will be very hard to turn back and could disrupt our efforts in Iraq, delaying further off-ramp opportunities. Our recommendation is to make off-ramp decisions at three-month intervals to best allow a proper assessment of the required off-ramp conditions. This interval will align appropriately with the other factors involved in making the off-ramp process flow smoothly.

GEORGE W. CASEY, JR. General, US Army



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
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
US off-ramp strategy linked to development of capable ISF

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




## Strategic Timeline



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






## March 2006 Decision Point


- Curtails 1/10th Mta Div (MND-B) by ~ 3 months
  - 2/1 ID does not deploy (LAD 26 Jun 06)
    - Curtails 2/28th ID (MMF-W) by ~ 1 month
      - No unit planned to backfill 2/28th ID (OIF 06-08 sourced at 13 × BCTs)
- Decision Point Timeline Templates



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
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## **Off-Ramp Variables**

- Threat conditions
- Capabilities of SF
- Impact on partnerships
- Replacement of Transition Teams
- Ministry capability development
- Almost continuous realignment of battlespace
- Base transfers, consolidation and/or closures
- Enabler adjustment to support Transition Teams and S
- Transfer of equipment sets/property accountability
- Realignment of area coverage for Enabling Forces



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